QUICK culturism is all about, multi culturism is


 ACCORDING TO Will Kymlicka



long as human being decide to co-exist, multi culture will always continue to
be a term that will always come into play, there is no typical society with
which the presence of multi culture cannot be felt, to better understand what
multi culturalism is , one must first look at the definition

I have outlined a summary of what multi culturism is  all about, multi culturism is the
preservation of different cultures or cultural identities within a unified
society, as a state or nation. When there is the presence of, or support for
the presence of, several distinct cultural or ethnic groups within a society,
we refer such conditions as multi-cultural. Multiculturalism is closely associated with “identity
politics,” “the politics of difference,” and “the politics of recognition,” all
of which share a commitment to revaluing disrespected identities and changing
dominant patterns of representation and communication that marginalize certain
groups (Gutmann 2003, Taylor 1992, Young 1990).

am yet to find a society where this system multi-cultural is not yet adopted.
Multiculturalism is before anything else a theory about culture and its value.
Hence, to understand what multiculturalism is it is indispensable that the
meaning of culture is clarified. So I will try to outline five concepts that
best describe what culture is: A culture is semiotic, normative, societal,
economic/rational choice and the anti-essentialist cosmopolitanism conceptions
of culture. Therefore, it is possible to simultaneously defend, say, a semiotic
conception of culture and admit that a culture may have normative, societal,
economic and cosmopolitan features. Multi culturism is as old as
humanity-different cultures have always look for ways to co exit, and also
respect for diversity.


differentiated rights

proper understand what’s group differentiated right is, one needs to take a
look at what group rights is all about, will kymlicka, a Canadian political
philosopher view on Groups rights and group differentiated

group right is a right held by a group as a group rather than by its members
severally, this definition has been argue about whose is entitle to hold the
right in the group.  Others do not, but
worry about the threats that such rights pose for individuals and their rights.
They, in turn, are met by claims that individual rights and group rights,
suitably formulated, are complementary rather than conflicting and that some
group rights might even be human rights. A group right is a right possessed by
a group rather than by its members. Not emphasizing on right held by an
individual person as an individual. A clear example of a commonly asserted
group right is the right of a nation or a people to be self-determining. One
should not confuse group’s right with the right people possess in virtue of
being a members of group. The right of a citizen to vote in elections, is the
right of an individual person.

rights can be legal or moral or both, group right should not therefore be
identified with a “group-differentiated” right. That term has been coined by
Will Kymlicka (1995) to describe a right that is accorded to a particular group
but not to the larger society within which the group exists. For example, a
society might accord special rights, such as special territorial rights or
rights of self-government, to an indigenous minority in recognition of the
special status that that minority should enjoy within the larger society, or
out of concern for the vulnerability of the minority’s traditional form of
life. These would be “group-differentiated rights”. That term is now sometimes
abbreviated to “group right”, which is unfortunate since a group-differentiated
right may or may not be a group right in the ordinary sense (a right possessed
by the group qua group rather than by its members severally). For example, if
the group-differentiated right is the right of a group to be self-governing, it
will be a group right. But if it is, for example, a right unique to the members
of an indigenous minority to fish in certain waters and if that right is vested
in, and is exercisable by, the several individuals who make up the minority, it
will be a group-differentiated individual right. (Kymlicka 1995, 45–48; Jones

differentiated rights entails: Rights that vest on the basis of an individual’s
membership in a particular social or cultural group are an increasingly common
aspect of modern liberal legal systems. Such rights have been granted to
individual members of a broad array of social groups to remedy inequities associated
with, for example, the members’ race, sexual orientation, gender, age, economic
or disability status.  Rights similarly
have been afforded to individual members of cultural groups constituted
according to nationality, ethnicity or religion, to acknowledge and accommodate
particular beliefs or practices, or in recognition of collective claims to
self-government or property.  Yet since
group-differentiated rights openly distinguish among classes of persons in the
distribution of social benefits and burdens, this form of right has long been
the source of significant controversy within liberal political theory (Eric J.


Models of Group-Differentiated Rights as illustrated by Eric J. Mitnick

            A.        Ascription

right granted will of necessity be granted to a class of persons.  Rights-claimants able to demonstrate
sufficient congruity between their own particular circumstances and the
criteria indicated by a right’s investitive conditions will be included in a
class of rights-bearers.  Rights-claimants
who fail to meet such investitive criteria, and so are deemed in some important
respect dissimilar from those entitled to exercise the right, are thereby
excluded from the class.  Where the
dissimilarity between the classes of persons included and excluded from the
right is founded upon an ascribed characteristic (e.g., a moral or intellectual
trait associated with the right-claimant’s race or gender), both the inclusion
and the exclusion will result in the construction of social groups.  Membership in such an ascriptive social group
will contribute both to social and self-perceptions of the individual members’

            Consider, for example, the evolution
of the class of persons granted the right to vote in the United States.  At the founding, American suffrage remained
conditioned on state imposed landed property qualifications, usually combined
with specific legal exclusions for persons who were not free, white, male and
often adherents of a particular religion. 
Each such categorical exclusion was justified on the basis of
inegalitarian ascriptive assumptions regarding the excluded persons’ race,
culture, gender, religion or economic status.  
Persons within these categories, it was thought, could not possibly
possess the moral, civic and intellectual traits required of the
electorate.  As a result, each such
person was excluded from membership in the American political class.  At the same time, persons thus ascriptively
excluded were simultaneously included in a social group (or groups) constructed
according to the characteristic (race, gender, etc.) that served as the basis
for the assumed incapacity.  And
membership in each such social group, together with its inegalitarian
ascriptive subtext, would thus come to define an aspect of each individual
member’s identity.  Further, on the
opposite side of this rights equation, the categorical inclusion of freeholders
was justified on the basis of similarly inegalitarian, though now more
sanguine, ascriptive assumptions regarding such persons’ intellectual and moral
capacities and civic propensities.  And,
hence, membership in this more favored social group would come then to
constitute an aspect of each individual “citizen’s” social identity.

            Further examples of ascriptive
differentiation in legal rights abound. 
In the Dred Scott case, individuals of African descent were ascriptively
excluded from the class of constitutional persons deemed competent to bear
rights, with obvious effects on social and self-conceptions of such
“non-persons.”   Disabled individuals too
were long subject to ascriptive classification as non-persons for
constitutional purposes.   In the private
law context, married women were in most states deemed incompetent to contract
or possess property, reflecting the strikingly ascriptive notion that a woman
might cease to possess a separable identity upon marriage.

            In each of these cases, individuals
were sorted, and aspects of human identity defined, by law on the basis of
inegalitarian ascriptive criteria.  The
loss in constitutive autonomy in such a context is at an extreme.  Of course, such cases are now far less common
in modern liberal democratic legal systems. 
Yet the constitutive influence of such laws is instructive in assessing
two other, currently more prevalent, forms of differentiated citizenship.  Both rights that seek specially to affirm the
status of individual group members, and rights that would enable members of
cultural groups to self-exclude, share with ascriptive rights a formal
resemblance and an influence on their claimants’ social identities.  And yet in each case the moral calculus is
importantly different.

            B.         Affirmation

            At times a right will be granted
only to a particular subset of persons as part of an attempt to reverse the
inegalitarian consequences of a previous ascriptive exclusion, or to remedy the
exclusionary effects of social practices other than law itself.  And yet even this effort, an effort
ultimately to include otherwise subordinated persons, will of necessity result
in the legal system excluding a category of persons.  Although formally similar, this type of legal
exclusion is of a substantively different nature than the ascriptive
exclusionary process discussed above. 
The exclusion of a dominant class from a right granted to oppressed persons
is justified not on the basis of negative inegalitarian characteristics
ascribed to the excluded class, but rather on the ground that the particular
remedy afforded the included class will be conducive to genuine equality of
treatment for all.  In such a case, the
exclusion may function affirmatively to include a category of persons in need
of special protection.

            Mention of the affirmative form of
group-differentiated right will bring immediately to mind disputes over the
legitimacy of programs of affirmative action. 
And, indeed, a right to affirmative action on the basis of, say, past or
continuing racial discrimination, clearly would fall within this category.  Other examples of such rights of affirmation
considered in the longer paper include the recently passed Vermont Civil Unions
and Reciprocal Beneficiaries Law, which in an effort to protect the interests
of same-sex couples constitutes a new form of legal relationship, the “civil
union,”  and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, which grants rights against discrimination specially to
disabled persons.

in the ascriptive exclusionary cases described above, group-differentiated
rights of affirmation sacrifice not only formal equality of treatment but also,
potentially, individual constitutive autonomy. 
This is so because the bearers of such rights are sorted and defined by
law as members of particular social groups. 
At the same time, this does not mean that such rights are necessarily
inconsistent with a liberal conception of membership, although presumptively
they may be so.  Whether the presumption
may be overcome will depend on whether the moral cost in constitutive autonomy
is sufficiently offset by the advantage inclusion brings.  Thus, while the right to form a civil union,
as opposed to a marriage, perpetuates legal and social differentiation, the law
also importantly grants to same-sex couples all legal benefits to which married
couples are entitled.  While rights to
affirmative action may further construct social perceptions of the members of
subordinated social groups, such rights also afford their bearers precisely the
sorts of opportunities necessary more fully to construct their identities in
other spheres.  Indeed,
group-differentiated rights of affirmation are inherently constitutive, but
they are also often among the most crucial to the realization of justice for
oppressed persons.

            C.         Culturalization

            In contrast both to rights that
ascriptively constitute individuals as members of social groups, and rights
that seek affirmatively to include members of subordinated groups, are rights
that permit members of cultural groups, or the groups themselves in a
collective capacity, the freedom to exclude themselves from some aspect of
social life.  Unlike ascriptive and
affirmative rights, such culturally-differentiated rights often directly foster
constitutive autonomy by enabling cultural group members to construct their own
particular social identities.  In the
United States, religious conduct exemptions constitute perhaps the most prominent
example of this form of group-differentiated right.  Such exemptions permit cultural group members
to differentiate themselves from broader social groups, and in the process to
constitute further their particular identities.

dilemma, though, arises when the collective constitutive autonomy secured by
culturally-differentiated rights is used by elites within minority cultural
groups to subordinate more vulnerable members. 
Indeed, at times the nomos or traditional precepts of certain cultures
explicitly prescribe repression of individual members and internal
sub-groupings, most particularly women.  
Where this is the case, the moral costs apparent in the ascriptive
differentiated citizenship model are merely revived at a different level.  Cultural self-exclusion often facilitates the
capacity to self-define that is so central to a liberal conception of
membership.  But that constitutive
capacity loses its liberal coherence when aspects of individual identities are
constructed involuntarily, as they are when cultural groups use
accommodationist policy to subjugate vulnerable members.


explain the three forms of group differentiated rights


rights and

representation tights

examining this three forms will give us an intimate understanding of what group
differentiated right entails